Globalisation and monetary policy in emerging markets by Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala & Bank for International Settlements
BIS Papers No 23  269
 
Globalisation, financial markets and the 
operation of monetary policy: the case of Thailand 
Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala 
Overview 
This paper seeks to clarify how monetary policy in Thailand has evolved in response to the challenges 
posed by globalisation. It explores the role and impact of globalisation and financial integration on 
Thailand’s financial system and its implications for the economy over the last decade. Thailand’s 
economic and financial landscape has changed dramatically over this period to cope with the financial 
sector restructuring which the country had to undergo during the 1997 crisis, the challenges of the 
economic and financial environment, including economic and financial reforms, and the global trend 
towards adoption of international standards and codes on transparency of the conduct of policies. This 
paper will illustrate the impact of globalisation on Thailand’s financial system and the challenges for 
the Bank of Thailand (BOT) in conducting monetary policy. The paper recounts the events in three 
phases. The first phase covers Thailand’s liberalisation and integration into the global financial 
markets in the 1990s. The second phase covers the financial crisis of 1997, and the third phase will 
cover the evolution of the financial system post-crisis under current economic developments. The 
paper will end with a look at the challenges ahead and ways forward.  
1. Introduction 
The 1990s saw dramatic changes in the liberalisation and internationalisation of emerging market 
economies. During this period, Thailand’s financial system was gradually integrated into the regional 
and global system. The price system or the domestic interest rate structure was being set by market 
forces. Greater foreign participation was permitted while the scope of operation was enlarged and 
financial infrastructures strengthened. The aim was to ensure that the domestic financial system could 
effectively serve the needs of the production sector, making Thailand attractive to foreign direct 
investment and able to attract international capital, which had a lower cost than that from the domestic 
markets at the time. With a fixed exchange rate system, monetary policy operations revolved around 
the tasks of managing capital inflows through both foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio 
investments. 
A new milestone in Thailand’s economic and financial development was set by the events of the 1997 
financial crisis. The Thai authorities had to redefine and review the appropriateness of the strategies 
current at the time. New mechanisms were put in place to safeguard the economy and financial 
system against external shocks and volatilities inherent in an open financial system, while at the same 
time attempting to restore economic and financial stability. This included reforms across sectors, 
covering social, economic and government reforms, and particularly reforms of the banking system. A 
dual track approach involving parallel efforts to develop both an export-led strategy and domestic 
grass-roots economies was adopted to revamp the domestic foundation while at the same time better 
preparing the country for re-entry into the global market.  
At the time of writing, Thailand’s economic growth path has been restored, with growth of 6.8% in 
2003, inflation not posing an imminent threat and external conditions remaining strong. The new 
challenge facing us today is how to maintain this economic momentum of growth. On the external 
side, with the re-emergence of capital flows, the authorities need to remain vigilant and to be effective 
in the management of this increasing level of capital flows.  
The objective of this paper is to capture the impact of globalisation on Thailand’s domestic financial 
system and monetary policy through an analysis of financial and economic developments and the 
policy responses they elicit. Specifically, the paper attempts to address the following key questions. 
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challenges that lie ahead? To answer these two questions, this paper carefully examines the evidence 
surrounding the economic conditions.  
2.  Evolution of Thailand’s monetary/financial landscape: an overview 
2.1  Phase I: the Asian miracle - the period of the impossible trinity 
During the 1990s or the so-called period of the Asian miracle, the Thai economy was among the 
fastest-growing in the world, boasting double digit growth per annum, moderate inflation and a stable 
exchange rate. The Thai authorities managed the economy with a conservative fiscal policy and a 
basket-pegged exchange rate system as the anchor of monetary policy. Thailand experienced nine 
consecutive years of fiscal surplus between 1988 and 1996. The high investment rate in private 
enterprise investment, accounting for 40% of GDP, was financed by the high saving rates - 
intermediated almost exclusively via the banking sector - and the massive amount of capital flows 
which came in the form of both foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment.  
Graph 1 
Landscape of the Thai financial market 1988-2002  































  Note: Data for banks, specialised financial insitutions (SFIs) and non-bank FIs are as of May 2002. 
1    Bills, loans and overdrafts, excluding interbank transactions.     
2    Credit extended by finance, finance and 
securities, and credit foncier  companies.   
3    Credit extended by GSB, GHB, BAAC, EXIM Bank, IFCT and 
SIFC.   
4    Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) market capitalisation.     
5    Corporate bonds outstanding at par 
value.   
6  Data on outstanding public bonds before 1992 are not available. 
  Sources: BOT; SET; Thai Bond Dealing Centre. 
During this period, the development of the Thai economy relied heavily on bank credits. This reliance 
on bank lending as a source for funds subsequently led to the underdevelopment of alternative 
domestic funding instruments, as demonstrated in Graph 1. With economic growth reliant solely on 
bank lending, there was very little development of the capital market.  
Against this backdrop, commercial banks mobilised funds mainly through deposits, which accounted 
for roughly 80% of domestic banking liabilities. Commercial banks held almost 70% of total financial 
sector assets, mostly in the form of credits to the household and corporate sectors. 
The effectiveness of the interest rate as an instrument for the conduct of monetary policy was limited 
under the basket-pegged exchange rate system and an open capital account regime. The rule of the 
impossible trinity implied that interest rates could not be used freely as an instrument of monetary 
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short-term capital flows and credit policy, safeguard against excessive capital inflows and ensure a 
broad-based development of the productive sectors. On a positive note, the regime enabled borrowers 
to access funds at lower cost and introduced some degree of stability and predictability to the 
exchange rate level. Increased integration of financial markets brought with it the challenge of 
managing increased volatility of capital movements and domestic interest rates. This came about as 
capital flows that entered the country came in the form of short-term bank loans and bills of exchange, 
all of which were subject to volatility and sharp reversals of flows. The structure of these inflows - 
mainly short-term loans - came about from a combination of factors, including the fixed exchange rate 
and the free flow of capital, as well as the availability of funds through the Bangkok International 
Banking Facilities (BIBF).  
However, the extent of bank-based activity and inadequate supervision and regulation contributed 
significantly to the crisis. The over-reliance on banks combined with their role as intermediaries for the 
huge capital flows coming into the country overwhelmed the risk management capacity of banks. This 
fed through to banks’ lending policies, leading them to “over-lend” to sectors, which they might not 
have done under normal circumstances. The suddenness of the reversal of capital flows meant that 
banks were unable to adjust their operations in time, leading to a liquidity crunch in many banks.  
2.2  Phase II: the twin crises 
The economic and financial crisis that hit Thailand in 1997 triggered a change in the perspectives and 
outlook of the authorities. As has been the case in numerous countries, the crisis acted as a catalyst to 
bring about a rethink and a reorientation in national strategies and policies. The challenge for the BOT, 
as the country’s central banker, was unique. It needed to deal with the crisis in the banking sector as 
well as the consequences of the sharp devaluation in the currency. This event highlighted Thailand’s 
linkage with the global market.  
The challenges that we faced were the sudden stop and reversal of capital flows during the crisis. In 
1998, Thailand experienced a sharp reversal in capital flows (Graph 2) accounting for 13.8% of GDP. 
This was in contrast to the net inflows of some 10% of GDP in 1996. The exchange rate depreciated 
sharply from around THB 25/USD to a low of THB 56/USD on 13 January 1998. As a result, the 
banking system, burdened with huge losses and non-performing loans (NPLs) as foreign currency 
loans contracted by debtors became unserviceable, could no longer act as the engine of financing as 
in the past. 
Graph 2 
Thailand’s capital flows 1989-2001 
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As the exchange rate became very volatile, monetary policy had to tighten to stabilise the baht, which 
had become volatile from the loss of investor confidence not only in Thailand, but in the region as a 
whole, as the effect of the financial crisis continued to sweep through other countries in the region. 
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2.2.1  Monetary policy adjustment 
Given that a return to a fixed exchange rate was not considered a viable option in the light of the 
volatility of capital inflows and the unsettling experience from the recent crisis, the BOT recognised the 
need to find a new anchor.  
In the interim period following the adoption of the floating exchange rate system on 2 July 1997 and 
the IMF programme, a monetary targeting regime was adopted. Under this regime, the Bank targeted 
domestic money supply using the financial programming approach in order to ensure macroeconomic 
consistency as well as to reach the ultimate objectives of sustainable growth and price stability. The 
Bank set the daily and quarterly monetary base targets, on which its daily liquidity management was 
based. Daily liquidity management was essentially intended to guard against excessive volatility in 
interest rates and liquidity in the financial system. However, this regime was deemed inappropriate 
owing to instability in the relationships between money aggregates and macroeconomic objectives 
reflecting rapid and ongoing changes in the financial system. 
Towards the end of the IMF programme in 2000, and after careful consideration, the Bank of Thailand 
decided to adopt inflation targeting as a nominal anchor for its monetary policy framework.  
2.2.2  Banking sector reform 
The crisis made even clearer the degree of over-reliance of the Thai financial system on commercial 
banks in financing investment and economic growth, and highlighted the need to reform the domestic 
banking system. In a sense, Thailand managed to turn the crisis into an opportunity to reform the 
financial system. With commercial banks flooded with liquidity, demand for low-risk saving instruments 
also rose sharply to enable banks to invest the excess liquidity.  
The crisis in the banking sector meant multiple tasks for the authorities: to stabilise, manage and 
strengthen the financial system as well as financial institutions. Measures implemented to reform and 
restructure the financial system included the suspension of operation of 58 finance companies with the 
Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) as well as the creation of various organisations to deal 
with problems arising from the suspension, for example the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority 
(FRA), the Asset Management Corporation (AMC) and the Thai Asset Management Corporation 
(TAMC), to resolve the outstanding number of NPLs. Moreover, the capital bases of financial 
institutions were strengthened through a combination of new loan classification and provisioning and 
private sector led recapitalisation. Standards were tightened to be consistent with international 
standards and best practices. As a result, banks were required to recapitalise to meet these new 
standards, and those who failed to do so were taken over by the FIDF. Banks were also required to 
maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio at 8.5% in line with the Basel Accord.  
In addition, the restrictions on foreign ownership of Thai financial institutions were temporarily relaxed, 
allowing foreign investors to acquire major shareholdings for up to 10 years, with the actual holding of 
shares temporarily grandfathered thereafter (until the ratio is brought down to 49%). Furthermore, on 
14 August 1998, the government announced a comprehensive financial restructuring package 
focusing on four main aspects: (1) accelerated consolidation of banks and finance companies through 
additional interventions; (2) encouragement of private investment in the banking system; (3) provision 
of public funds to recapitalise viable financial institutions; and (4) development of a framework to 
create private asset management companies (AMCs). As a result, the authorities were required to 
intervene in seven banks and 69 finance companies.  
Over the years, NPLs in the Thai financial system have been steadily declining. From a peak of 
THB  2,729.4 billion in June 1999, NPLs declined to THB 772.6 billion in December 2002, or 
approximately 15.77% of total loans outstanding. Despite the progress made, the remaining NPLs 
continue to pose a challenge to financial institutions’ balance sheets, and have distracted them from 
focusing on new lending. In recent years, the performance of financial institutions has continued to 
improve, with operating profit increasing from THB 45.8 billion in 2001 to THB 77.5 billion in 2002 
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Table 1 
Performance of financial institutions
1 
In billions of Thai baht 
and per cent
2 
Items 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
1. Interest income    730.20    374.99   334.93   307.98   279.26 
2. Interest expense    663.39    312.87   226.86   182.74   149.03 
3.  Spread   66.81   62.12    108.06   125.25   130.23 
4. Non-interest income    58.69   58.17   71.24   73.04   88.12 
5. Operating expense    189.42    168.22   155.06   152.47   140.87 
6. Operating profit (loss)    (63.92)   (47.94)   24.25   45.82   77.47 
7. Provisions    370.90    366.38    130.38   53.07   50.16 
8. Income tax    (0.70)   7.03  5.21  4.63  3.11 
9. Extraordinary items
3    0.52   13.62    105.82   99.42    0.08 
10. Net profit (loss)    433.60    407.74   (5.53)   87.54   24.28 
11. Yield on loan    9.70    5.16  4.99  5.40  4.68 
12. Yield on deposit    10.76   4.90  3.27  2.54  2.08 
13. Spread    (1.06)    0.26  1.73  2.87  2.60 
14.  ROA   (5.74)  (6.00)   (0.08)  1.30  0.35 
1  Financial institutions include commercial banks, finance companies and credit foncier companies.   
2  Items 1 to 10 are in 
Thai baht; items 11 to 14 are in per cent.   
3  Extraordinary items in 2001 are mostly reversed provisionings. 
 
2.3  Phase III: new challenges 
The past two years have seen a remarkable improvement in our domestic economic conditions. 
Growth has not only been stable, but has advanced at a relatively high rate, with GDP growth for the 
year 2003 expected to be in the range of 5.75-6.25% at the time of writing. Thai economic growth in 
2004 is expected at 5.5-6.5%. The current accommodative monetary and fiscal policies are 
appropriate for our economic conditions at present. The inflation targeting and the managed floating 
exchange rate regime in this low interest rate environment are aimed towards supporting and boosting 
domestic demand, supplementing the strategy of export-led growth adopted earlier.  
The present low interest rate, which has hit the bottom of the cycle, poses new challenges and risks, in 
particular as regards the timing of the tightening cycle. Currently the authorities, including the BOT, are 
closely monitoring the movement of equity and asset prices. In addition to the domestic front, external 
stability has also been one of our top priorities. This concern is reflected in the build-up of foreign 
exchange reserves, which has led to the prepayment of loans from the IMF official financing package 
in July 2003, as well as close monitoring of movement of the baht and of the balance of payments.  
Another pressing issue is how central banks conduct policy in a world of volatile capital flows. More 
recently, it has been necessary for the BOT to find ways to manage the “return” of a large volume of 
capital inflows into Thailand, and to prevent them from disrupting economic growth. On 23 July 2003, 
the Bank announced the relaxation of exchange control regulations, aiming to promote Thai residents’ 
investment abroad and to offer alternative investment opportunities for residents. This was due mainly 
to temporary excessive savings, and these limits will be reviewed from time to time to suit the 
prevailing economic and financial situation. In addition, the BOT eased a number of other rules, 
including that on the holding of foreign currency deposits, allowing local state enterprises to hedge 
their foreign currency debts, as well as allowing Thai residents to issue structured products whose 
returns are linked to external variables, such as exchange rates and foreign assets. On a related 
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Thai baht. This included restrictions on non-residents opening nostro accounts in baht with financial 
institutions in Thailand. While originally intended to facilitate the settlement of international trade and 
investment transactions, these accounts have also provided avenues for speculative activities. The 
authorities introduced restrictions on the use of these accounts (ie for settlement only) and a cap on 
outstanding amounts for accounts (not exceeding THB 300 million per non-resident), as well as 
ensuring that financial institutions refrain from paying interest on current and savings accounts of 
non-residents (except for fixed accounts with maturity of at least six months). 
To discourage the practice of over-reliance of the Thai financial system on bank intermediation, the 
Thai authorities have taken steps to develop the domestic capital markets, an issue which ranks high 
on the economic agenda. A deep and liquid capital market will help facilitate and support the 
development of the Thai economy as well as sustaining its competitiveness in the global marketplace. 
Objectives in developing the capital market are to provide an effective source of financing, to create a 
favourable investment environment with a diverse investor base, to provide a world-class infrastructure 
with low transaction costs, and to encourage the establishment of strong and qualified institutional 
intermediaries. At the same time, the authorities aim to promote good corporate governance and any 
necessary measures that serve the appropriate needs of investors.  
There is now regular issuance and trading of government securities, thus providing the market with an 
efficient and reliable benchmark yield curve. Daily turnover has risen considerably to around 
THB 11 billion per day at end-August 2003, up by almost 50% from 2002. This is a very significant 
turnover volume, given that the stock market has long dominated the Thai capital market. To this end, 
the authorities are working on promoting the essential infrastructure for bond market development, 
including the development of a private repurchase market and an electronic trading platform for bonds. 
To encourage investment and active participation by market players, the markets for hedging risk are 
also being developed, including the long-term interest swap market. 
3. Globalisation  continued 
While the era of globalisation has been around for more than a decade, and has seen developments 
in information and communications technology unparalleled in modern economic history, for Thailand 
this is only the beginning. As a small and open economy, it is unavoidable that we will be affected by 
changes and shocks in the global arena. This was clear during the crisis; many of the triggers for 
policy changes were a result of global pressure and direction. In the past we have adopted defensive 
mechanisms to tackle these challenges and problems, but this strategy has proven costly and painful.  
Looking forward, we recognise the need to be more active in coping with the shocks and pressures of 
the global economy. In order to be better prepared for such events, we have also recognised the need 
to build an early warning system that would alert us to external risks, uncertainties and possible 
turbulence. In this light, the members of ASEAN and EMEAP have attempted to develop self-help 
mechanisms as well as credible surveillance and peer review processes. At the regional level, Asian 
economies have worked together to develop deep and liquid regional bond markets which could 
provide a predictable source of funding for the government, state-owned enterprises and private firms. 
Bond markets also offer alternative investment opportunities for savers, and will increase the efficiency 
of the disintermediation process in Asia. Not only will efficient bond markets in Asia help mitigate the 
potential risk of double (currency and maturity) mismatches, they will also facilitate intraregional trade 
and investment and create a closer link among regional financial markets.  
Despite the recent positive developments, it is important that the authorities not become complacent in 
the effort to continue raising standards and improving practices in our financial system. Further 
questions that arise include: what needs to be done so that we can be ready to meet future 
challenges? How can we better manage financial integration? Moreover, as a small open economy, to 
reap the full benefit of globalisation we need collective effort to create stable macroeconomic 
conditions, well developed financial systems, an effective early warning system and crisis resolution 
mechanisms. The 1997 crisis showed us that collective action is required to maintain growth and 
development in the world economy. The changes that Thailand has had to undergo - be they the 
change in the exchange rate regime, the search for the new anchor and framework for monetary 
policy, or the financial sector restructuring and massive capitalisation of banks - are but a single 
dimension, namely, the domestic front. The international front - where there arise the new demands 
and challenges of regional and global linkages - will open a new chapter for monetary cooperation. 